Paper's abstract

Alain Boyer, It would be irrational to ignore consequences
What is important is not the "aristocratical" question of the foundations of a proposal, but the "democratic" question of the value of its pratical consequences (Popper): in morality, that is not experience, but our conscience that decides to accept such or such consequence. Rawls contrasts "deontological theories" to "teleological ones" : the first ones define justice independently of the good, while the second ones define it as the maximisation of the good. But a deontological theorie is not necessarly anti-consequentialist : "Not to take consequences into account would simply be irrational, crazy". Any rational moral theory is bound to be a "moral of responsibility" (open to criticism) and not a dogmatic "moral of conviction", even if some basic intuitive judgements are our "fixed points". Consequentialism is not necessarly utilitarian : one can try to minimize injustice. These hypotheses are illustrated by several juridical examples.


Key Words : Rawls, morals, teleology, civil responsibility
t. 48, 2004 : p. 275-289