Paper's abstract

Idil Boran, Consequentialism and the prediction objection
This paper examines what might be called « the prediction objection » that could be raised against consequentialism. The objection runs as follows. Consequentialism requires the agent to choose the action that brings the best overall outcome. But it is often impossible to know how the consequences of our actions are going to turn out. Consequentialism requires us to make predictions about consequences that we are not always in a position to do. Although consequentialism has been subject to many objections, this particular objection has received relatively less attention. It presents nonetheless a significant challenge for it claims that consequentialism denies the « ought implies can » principle. The paper argues that a version of consequentialism can be devised such that it overcomes this problem. What is offered is not an overall defence of consequentialism, but merely an argument that consequentialism can be made immune to this particular problem.

Key Words : prediction
t. 48, 2004 : p. 305-313

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