Paper's abstract

Richard & Justus Bellamy & Schönlau, The Normality of Constitu-tional Politics: An Analysis of the Drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
Constitutional politics is often contrasted with normal politics on the grounds that the former involves deliberation on matters of principle and leads to a normative consensus, whereas the latter is characterized by self-interested bargaining and produces a compromise. We challenge this account in two respects. First, we argue that what Rawls called the 'burdens of judgment' mean that even on issues of principle there can be a plurality of reasonable views not all of which will be fully compatible with each other. Second, we contend that the bargaining and compromises typical of normal politics have many normative attractions and can be well suited to resolving disagreements of principle. We illustrate our argument via a detailed exami-nation of the convention that drew up the EU Charter of Fundamental European Rights.

Key Words : Rawls, constitutional policy
t. 49 : 2005, p. 85-108

---