Paper's abstract

Speranta Dumitru, Public Reason: a Political not an Epistemological Conception
John Rawls’ latter writings are marked by both an increasing acknowledge-ment of the “fact of pluralism” and a defense of a “political” conception of public justification, free from metaphysical and epistemological constraints. The aim of this paper is to show that epistemic abstinence is neither a way to ensure mutual respect between citizens, nor a mean to diminish disagreement in pluralistic societies. It is argued that doing one’s best in the observance of epistemic norms of justification may be an indirect but certainly better-established way to display respect to moral persons seen not only as capable to form but also to revise their conceptions of good.

Key Words : Rawls, justification, epistemic norms
t. 49 : 2005, p. 159-170